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Background: Financial and nonfinancial conflicts of interest in medicine and surgery are troubling because they
have the capacity to skew decision making in ways that might be detrimental to patient care and well-being. The
recent case of the Articular Surface Replacement (ASR) hip provides a vivid illustration of the harmful effects of
conflicts of interest in surgery.
Discussion: We identify financial and nonfinancial conflicts of interest experienced by surgeons, hospitals and
regulators in the ASR case. These conflicts may have impacted surgical advice, decision-making and evidence
gathering with respect to the ASR prosthesis, and contributed to the significant harms experienced by patients in
whom the hip was implanted. Drawing on this case we explore shortcomings in the standard responses to conflicts
of interest – disclosure and recusal. We argue disclosure is necessary but by no means sufficient to address conflicts
of interest. Using the concept of recusal we develop remedies including second opinions and third party consent
which may be effective in mitigating conflicts, but their implementation introduces new challenges.
Summary: Deployment of the ASR hip is a case of surgical innovation gone wrong. As we show, there were
multiple conflicts of interest involved in the introduction of the ASR hip into practice and subsequent attempts to
gloss over the mounting body of evidence about its lack of safety and effectiveness. Conflicts of interest in surgery
are often not well managed. We suggest strategies in this paper which can minimise the conflicts of interest
associated with surgical innovation.
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Surgical innovation raises ethical concerns to do with
increased risk of harms to patients, inadequate in-
formed consent, conflicts of interest and potentially in-
appropriate health care spending. The recent case of
the Articular Surface Replacement (ASR) hip provides
an excellent illustration of the ways these ethical concerns
are not idle philosophical speculation, but manifest and
play out in practice. In this paper we focus solely on con-
flicts of interest regarding surgical innovation. We identify
a number of financial and other conflicts implicated in the
case and examine how their effects might be prevented or
at least mitigated in the future.* Correspondence: jane.johnson@mq.edu.au
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article, unless otherwise stated.The paper begins by outlining the conflicts of interest
that were involved, before briefly describing salient features
of the ASR case and identifying the financial and nonfi-
nancial conflicts that arose with respect to this prosthesis.
Finally, we consider remedies to help prevent or mitigate
some of the harmful effects that conflicts of interest have
the potential to generate in surgery.
Conflicts of interest in surgery, and in healthcare
generally, are of concern because they have the capacity
to skew decision making in ways that might possibly, but
not necessarily, impact patient care adversely. Broadly
speaking, these conflicts can arise in professional contexts
when a secondary interest has the potential to distract
from and/or affect a primary one [1,2]. Primary interests
are those directly related to fulfilling a particular role and
in the case of surgeons, these include acting in the
best interests of patients, promoting patient welfare,Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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do so and so forth. Conversely, secondary interests are
not directly related to the role in question, and might
include receiving a payment for designing a device or
promoting a particular product. Such secondary inter-
ests may be entirely legitimate; however they remain
conflicts and have the potential to distract from primary
interests or inappropriately bias the professional in their
primary capacity.
With respect to surgeons, the bias caused by conflicts
of interest can influence decision making in one of two
ways. First, decisions might be affected quite deliberately
with a surgeon intentionally choosing a particular device
because of a financial relationship with the manufac-
turer, such as being a consultant for them. Such purpose-
ful actions are unprofessional, unethical, and potentially
fraudulent. Second, a surgeon might be influenced uncon-
sciously; for instance, being unaware that their reason for
a preferring a particular device derives from a favourable
relationship with a manufacturer. There is evidence
that unconscious bias is potentially more widespread
and harmful than conscious bias (which may be considered
a form of bribery). This is because the decision-maker
is unaware of it, and the bias can arise from apparently
innocuous interactions and gifts, which are known to
trigger feelings of reciprocity in the beneficiary [3].
There is also evidence that surgeons are more tolerant
of conflicts of interest than, for instance, medical physi-
cians [4]. This is arguably the result of changes in the rela-
tionships between surgeons and device manufacturers
over time such that industry representatives are frequently
now part of the theatre team, regarded as colleagues and
friends [4]. Contemporary innovations tend to be driven
by industry rather than surgeons, with the former seeking
out prominent surgeons to be involved in what can some-
times amount to expensive ‘me too’ devices with unclear
or unnecessary indications [5].
The nature and extent of financial relationships be-
tween industry and surgeons are hard to track. However,
work by Hockenberry et al. reveals payments from five
device manufacturers to orthopaedic surgeons disclosed
as part of the settlement of a US Department of Justice
law suit. The payments were for consulting, royalties and
research support. In 2007, the mean payment received by
orthopaedic surgeons from the five manufactures was
$190,331. In 2010, it was $233,108 (based on data available
from three firms only). Some payments were in excess of
$1,000,000 [6].
Financial conflicts of interest receive the most attention,
where the secondary interest competing with the primary
one derives from some type of monetary incentive or
reward. As we discuss below, however, nonfinancial
conflicts also arise in surgery and may be more challenging
to identify and remedy.As well as impacting on the decision making of surgeons,
conflicts of interest can also influence patient decision
making, and the way healthcare funding is disbursed.
The recent case of the Articular Surface Replacement
(ASR) hip provides a vivid illustration of the effects of
conflicts of interest.
DePuy Orthopedics (a subsidiary of Johnson and
Johnson) launched the ASR hip in the late 1990s. The
hip used metal-on-metal technology with components
made from cobalt, chromium and titanium. There were
two versions of the ASR prosthesis– one offered total
hip replacementa and the other the resurfacing of nat-
ural hips.b ASR hips involved a smaller surgical incision
than competitors [7] and the metal-on-metal technology
promised reduced risk of fracture and dislocation, good
positional sensitivity, and greater longevity [8]. Compared
to total hip replacement, the resurfacing option offered
quicker recovery rates and the potential for greater and
lasting mobility; these features opened up the possibility
that younger and more active individuals (who require
a robust and long-lasting hip replacement) could be
candidates for the ASR prosthesis.
Both types of ASR hip were approved for use in the
European Union and Australia, while in the United States
only the total hip replacement was approved, though US
surgeons could use the resurfacing option ‘off label’ [9].
Over time ASR hips have been implicated in a range
of localised and systemic health problems including pain,
inflammation, infection, tiredness, nausea, visual im-
pairments, problems with mobility, tinnitus, heart palpi-
tations and depression [10]. Perhaps the most unequivocal
measure of the failure of both versions of the ASR hip is
their high revision rate (i.e. the need to re-operate). These
problems seem to have arisen primarily as a result of the
design of the ASR hip which can lead to metal grinding
on metal. This in turn contributes to disintegration of
the prosthesis, leakage of cobalt and chromium ions and
subsequent toxicity.
In 2010 DePuy, after a protracted campaign denying
that there were problems with the prostheses, issued a
worldwide recall of the ASR hip.
In the following section we identify a range of conflicts
of interest that arose in the case of the ASR hip and suggest
ways in which such conflicts and their impact might be pre-
vented, or at least mitigated, in the future.
Discussion
Financial conflicts of interest and the ASR hip
The ASR case involved financial conflicts of interest on
the part of surgeons, hospitals and regulators and these
played out in ways that arguably contributed to patient
harm.
Surgeons involved in the design of the ASR hip pros-
theses received significant royalties, which, if properly
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sional norms. Legislation in the US requires disclosure of
relevant company payments so that it is known that in
2009–10 designer Thomas Schmalzried received a little
under US $3 million and Thomas Vail just over US
$500,000 [9]. Apart from legitimate royalties, DePuy
provided direct financial inducements to orthopaedic
surgeons to use their products through the use of sham
consulting agreements [11]. In addition, some surgeons
were recruited as speakers for industry-sponsored and
industry-funded events aimed at other surgeons. Some
idea of the scale of these activities may be gleaned from
fines levied on DePuy. For example, in the US DePuy
paid $84.7 million to avoid prosecution over induce-
ments it paid to surgeons to use DePuy products [10],
while in the UK the company was fined almost £5 mil-
lion for unlawful payments to doctors in Greece [9].
These financial incentives had the capacity to influence
surgical advice and decision making in favour of the
ASR hip.
Informed consent may have been compromised when
surgeons failed to notify patients of the financial benefits
they stood to gain upon use of the ASR prosthesis.
Patients may have considered this information relevant
to their decision as to whether to proceed with this
surgeon, this operation and this particular prosthesis. There
is evidence that informed consent was compromised in at
least two cases involving Roger Oakeshott, one of the six
designers of the ASR hip. Two of Oakeshott’s patients
expressed surprise when told, after experiencing problems
with the hip, that Oakeshott had been involved in its
design [7].
Another potential impact of surgeons’ conflicts of
interest involves the collection and presentation of evidence
about the performance of the prosthesis. In this instance
rather than reporting problems with the ASR device, some
surgeons with links to DePuy simply stopped using the
hip [9]. This may have prevented these surgeons from
inflicting further patient harm, but is ethically inadequate
as a response since it hindered evidence gathering. A more
appropriate response would have involved reporting the
problems which led these surgeons to abandon the pros-
thesis, which may in turn have lead to an earlier recall of
the hip, with fewer patients exposed to the device.
There is some controversy over whether the problems
that emerged in relation to the ASR hip could have been
predicted [9]. Whether or not this is the case, there is
evidence that material produced by surgeons with finan-
cial links to DePuy sought to discount emerging concerns
about the prosthesis. For instance, in response to high
revision rates identified through the Australian National
Joint Replacement Registry, Professor Vail, an ASR design
surgeon, wrote a ‘white paper’ indicating how the Australian
data ought to be interpreted. The paper explained awaythe Australian results by suggesting they did not properly
factor in learning curvesc and that Australian results
differed from those obtained in other jurisdictions [9].
Another designer, Thomas Schmalzried, wrote a paper
‘Setting the record straight on metal hypersensitivity’
intended to allay concerns regarding the metal-on-metal
technology employed in the ASR hips [12]. Although there
can be genuine disagreement over facts and their inter-
pretation in medical science, thus opening up a legitimate
place for academic debate about the merits of particular
procedures or devices, we now know that the position
taken in these papers did not adequately reflect other evi-
dence available to DePuy.
Surgeons were not the only group with financial con-
flicts of interest over the ASR hip. Hospitals and other
health care providers received financial incentives to use
the device in their institutions. For example in the US
Johnson and Johnson were fined for making “improper
payments to publicly employed health care providers in
Greece, Poland and Romania in order to induce the pur-
chase of medical devices and pharmaceuticals” produced
by their subsidiaries such as DePuy [9], p. 3. In Australia,
a Senate Committee heard from a patient who claimed
that Johnson and Johnson’s sponsorship of a hospital
fellowship was linked to the hospital’s use of the com-
pany’s products [10].
Regulatory bodies were likewise not immune from
conflicts of interest related to these prostheses. In the
UK the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory
Agency established an expert advisory group to investigate
the risks of metal-on-metal technology. Three of the eight
members had conflicts of interest; two were consultants
to DePuy and one worked for Smith and Nephew, the
company which produced the competitor metal-on-metal
Birmingham hip [12].
Nonfinancial conflicts of interest in the ASR case
As well as financial conflicts, it is reasonable to assume
that the ASR case involved non-financial conflicts for
surgeons, both external as well as within role. As we
discuss below, nonfinancial conflicts may be difficult
to identify and substantiate in particular cases, and be
controversial in a way that financial conflicts are not. It
may therefore seem both odd and problematic to make
reference to such conflicts. However there are at least
three reasons to do so. First, it appears that non-financial
conflicts are frequently overlooked partly because financial
ones are more familiar, more straightforward to identify
and seemingly easier to manage or potentially resolve.
Ease of identification and redress are not, however, compel-
ling ethical reasons to focus solely on financial conflicts.
Second, non-financial conflicts can influence behaviour
even though they may be difficult to identify and their
precise impact hard to assess. Research suggests patients
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generated by being an industry consultant or speaker, or
designer of a prosthesis, can bias surgeons [13]. Third,
these conflicts need to be raised and discussed in order to
develop adequate and comprehensive responses to con-
flicts of interest in surgery.
Nonfinancial external conflicts of interest have as their
secondary interest an incentive or motivation which
conflicts with a surgeon’s primary role with respect to
providing care for the patient. These secondary interests
may be legitimate in their own right, but risk comprom-
ising patient care when they come into conflict with a
primary interest. Morreim et al. identifies a mix of inter-
ests which may motivate surgical innovation, including
secondary and within role ones, such as:
‘‘the intangible reward of emotional excitement from
breaking new ground and making new discoveries,
the possibility of enhanced reputation and of
academic advancement through discovery of new
information and its publication; the possibility of
obtaining grants, awards, or contracts to create a
formal clinical trial if an innovation is successful,
and perhaps the satisfaction of very strong
personal dedication to advancing the science
of medicine’’ [14], p. 1957.
As it is not possible to know or measure an individ-
ual’s psychological state or motivations, it is equally not
possible to identify accurately the specific nonfinancial
rewards surgeon innovators in the ASR case may have
experienced. Nonetheless it is important to at least
consider that such nonfinancial rewards may have
played a role in this case and note that we should aim
to develop ways in which the adverse impacts of such
rewards may be minimized in the future.
Within role conflicts arise in surgery because two
legitimate primary surgical obligations - to act in the
patient’s best interests, and to innovate for the benefit
of current and future patientsd can be in tension such
that pursuing one can compromise the other. In seek-
ing to innovate, an individual patient’s care might be
compromised by the surgeon’s unsubstantiated opti-
mism about the innovation’s advantages, superiority
over alternatives, their own skill in performing that
innovation, favourable complication rates and so forth.
Such conflicts are problematic because surgery necessarily
involves uncertainty and questions of judgement, thus
opening up a space in which unconscious bias can in-
appropriately influence patient care [5].
Given the conflicts of interest that emerge from the
ASR case, we now consider possible remedies which
might prevent or at least mitigate conflicts and their in-
jurious impacts in the future.ePossible remedies
Financial conflicts
Conflicts of interest may be addressed by preventative
measures such as avoidance, and measures to address
existing conflicts such as disclosure, divestment, and
recusal [2,15]. How effective might these have been in
the ASR case? In considering these traditional remedies
we canvass other possible remedies, some of which, as
we note, are more feasible to implement than others.
Disclosure about the financial rewards dispensed by
companies like device manufacturers to surgeons and
hospitals is increasing. The existence of laws such as the
Sunshine Act in the US means, for instance, that we
know the sums involved in the royalty payments to the
US based ASR designers and in fact all monies paid to
physicians and surgeons by industry. However, while
disclosure may reveal financial conflicts of interest, in
and of itself disclosure does nothing to remedy them or
mitigate their potential biasing effects.f Disclosure may
in fact give the appearance that conflicts of interest are
being dealt with in a way that is not consonant with the
actual impact of disclosure.g This view is supported by a
2013 survey which found that 71% of surgeons agreed
that simply declaring monies received for speaking,
consulting, travel or research is adequate for dealing with
financial conflicts of interest [4].
We agree with authors [16,17] who note that disclosure
does not address the effects of conflicts of interest but
rather shifts the burden onto the recipient of that in-
formation, such as patients. However, disclosure does
serve some purposes, such as identifying the presence
of financial ties, and opening these up to scrutiny as to
their potential justifiability. For instance, while it may
be reasonable for surgeons to receive royalty payments
for their role in developing or designing devicesh, other
forms of payment may lack comparable justification.
Payments for simply using a product or achieving certain
quotas are ethically indefensible, as are payments where a
role is being remunerated which appears tokenistic, for
example in some cases where surgeons act as consultants
or spokespeople. In this instance disclosure helps draw
attention to the full range of remunerations and thus can
identify payments that appear to be little more than direct
incentives to use specific products. Once identified, pro-
fessional or institutional policy should make rulings on
which kinds of payments are acceptable and why, and pro-
hibit those that are aimed at promotion or marketing. We
think that disclosure is a warranted and feasible first step
in addressing conflicts of interest.
How disclosure is achieved also matters. Simply having
information available on the public record about a sur-
geon’s role in developing a device and any financial
payments they may receive as a result of designing or
using that device is insufficient, as research indicates
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website disclosing financial ties [16]. It seems likely
that disclosure to patients by the individual surgeon is
essential to fully informed consent.i Again, however,
being transparent about a conflict does not necessarily
dilute its power to influence decision making, and as
social science research suggests, may paradoxically in-
crease bias [18]. The surgeon, having been open about
their financial conflict, may then, intentionally or other-
wise, present a more partial view of the evidence for using
the device [19]. The effect of disclosure on patients is
unpredictable. In response to learning of the surgeon’s
conflict, the patient may be wary of or discount the
surgeon’s advice; or they may respond favourably to this
disclosure and value what might be perceived as the
surgeon’s honesty. They might even regard it as admirable
that their surgeon has shown confidence in a device
through investing in its development [18].
Likewise in the case of hospitals and other health care
providers, disclosure about industry payments appears
necessary but insufficient to mitigate the possible effects
wrought by conflicts of interest. However, disclosure of
the nature of interactions and magnitude of payments
may signal a need to question their justification. For
instance, depending on the context and the manner in
which it is undertaken, it may be appropriate for hospitals
to use industry funding for training their surgeons in the
use of new devices. Surgeons need to be trained if they are
to competently and effectively use innovative products
and it may be preferable to have this training based at a
local hospital rather than provided to individual surgeons
in more exotic locations. Payments that raise greater con-
cerns include those which attempt to induce hospitals to
purchase a particular device or which provide financial
incentives to use specific devices or meet quotas. As with
individual surgeons, disclosure is a necessary first step in
identifying and assessing the nature of the interactions
leading to payment. The next step is the development of
policy to manage justifiable interactions and prohibit those
that cannot be justified on the basis of enhancing patient
care. Again, this is a suggestion which we argue could be
successfully implemented.
Thus transparencyj on its own appears to be insuffi-
cient to address the conflicts of interest raised by the
ASR case. Disclosure can however help determine when
divestment of the interest (for example severing a con-
flicted relationship, or selling relevant shares) or recusal
is appropriate, and assist with compliance checking. We
now turn to the strategy of recusal, which is necessary if
the conflict cannot be resolved by divestment of the
interest.
Recusal requires an individual to step back from decision
making when they have a conflict of interest to ensure the
conflict does not inappropriately influence decision making.In the case of the ASR hip this would mean requiring that
those surgeons who have designed the hip or received other
financial payments from DePuy or Johnson and Johnson,
be excluded from the process of recommending the hip to
patients, though they might still be permitted to perform
the relevant surgery if recommended by others. However
this suggestion seems problematic on a number of fronts,
and might, contra the intent of recusal, impact adversely on
patient care. Part of a surgeon’s role is diagnostic and
involves assessing a patient’s suitability for a particular
procedure, in addition to then performing that procedure.
It seems likely that a surgeon experienced with a particu-
lar device or procedure might be better positioned to
make the appropriate judgements to ensure the best out-
comes for a patient.k This may however be compromised
by the optimism bias we discuss below.
Perhaps rather than recusal then, a financially conflicted
surgeon might be required to recommend that patients
receive a second opinion from a surgeon who is not simi-
larly conflicted.l But this strategy is also problematic. Such
a measure assumes the second surgeon is neutral and does
not have his/her own conflict with respect to other manu-
facturers or devices. If the surgical environment is highly
competitive, a surgeon might be inclined to recommend
their favoured option regardless of patient circumstances.
Alternately, a surgical environment with a culture of colle-
giality might lead the second surgeon to simply backup
the recommendation of the first so as not to undermine
professional authority. Seeking a second opinion also takes
time and incurs additional costs, and unless mandated or
widely accepted, might create mistrust between the patient
and surgeon. If the surgeon him or herself recommends
that the patient seek a second opinion, the patient may be
concerned that the surgeon lacks faith in their own skills
and judgement. Conversely, if initiated by the patient, the
surgeon may feel mistrusted by the patient. A further issue
is that offering patients the choice of surgeon – the pro-
vider of standard treatment, or the surgeon who prefers
device A, or B, or C etc. may place too heavy a burden on
individual patients to circumvent conflicts of interest. A
patient, already vulnerable, may be left feeling bewildered
and disempowered when confronted with a variety of
advice offered by experts in an area outside their ken.
Thus a system of second opinions is not at this point in
time a practical means of addressing surgical conflicts of
interest.
Another way of dealing with this situation would be
for a surgeon to recuse themselves from the procedures
surrounding consent; rather than the treating surgeon
explaining and describing the procedure, a third party
could be charged with undertaking this process. This
would enable a person without the relevant conflict to
provide information including the number of times the
surgeon has performed a procedure; how the procedure
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(insofar as they can be anticipated); the state of evidence
about safety and efficacy etc. This process would also
allow a patient to reach a decision about for example,
whether to opt for the ASR or Birmingham hip, away
from the direct sphere of influence of their surgeon. This
would potentially allow patients to act in line with their
risk profile – some will be keen to be the first to have a
new procedure, while others may be more risk averse
[17]. Again, however, this strategy has shortcomings. In
the first instance a surgeon has a moral obligation to
ensure a patient’s consent is genuinely informed and freely
given so that transferring responsibility for consent onto a
third party could be regarded as failing to fulfil this obliga-
tion.m Second, unless this process was normalized it
would, as in the case of second opinions, have the poten-
tial to undermine the surgeon-patient relationship. Third,
there would be issues over who could provide this neutral
consent process, and how additional costs and logistical
issues should be managed. Thus while this suggestion too
presents significant practical challenges, features of it such
as determining the amount of information to be provided
to patients in situations of conflicts of interest could be
implemented. For example, institutional committees could
mandate the use of coloured consent forms in cases of
potential conflicts of interest, and this would prompt the
surgeon to disclose and discuss their conflict.
Another feasible strategy for managing the conflicts of
interest of institutions, hospital administrators, managers
and others charged with making purchasing decisions
about devices and equipment is for these individuals to
simply recuse themselves from decisions in situations
where they or the organization have benefited financially
from manufacturers.
Recusal also seems an appropriate and manageable re-
sponse to conflicts of interest on the part of those making
regulatory decisions. Thus the composition of the UK’s
expert advisory group on metal-on-metal technology
should not have included individuals linked to the ASR or
Birmingham hips. If the kind of knowledge and expertise
possessed by these individuals was required to inform the
process (as seems possible), it could have been sought
from these individuals qua expert advisors with no direct
role in making decisions and recommendations.
Developing strategies other than disclosure, divestment
and recusal are important given some of the shortcomings
in these mechanisms noted above, as well as the apparent
necessity of industry-surgeon links to facilitate device
innovation,n and the ostensible tolerance of surgeons to
conflicts of interest discussed earlier. An option suggested
by Paul Thagard is to increase individuals’ awareness of
how the brain functions when making ethical decisions.
As he comments “[p]erhaps if people knew more about
how cognition and affect are intimately connected andhow the connections are inaccessible to conscious intro-
spection, they would be much less confident about the
basis and validity of their decisions” [20], p. 378. Surgi-
cal education and continuing professional development
could incorporate relevant work in moral neuropsych-
ology explaining the ways in which conflicts of interest
lead to unconscious bias. This might have the effect of
de-stigmatising conflicts of interest for surgeons while
simultaneously forcing them to take seriously mechanisms
to minimize their untoward impacts. Educational initiatives
could teach surgeons about the neuropsychological basis
of the bias that results from conflicts of interest. This
would help them to appreciate that being impacted by
conflicts of interest (at least unconsciously) is not an
individual moral failing; and that avoidance is the most
reliable way to avoid the effects of conflicts of interest.
Such open discussion might encourage surgeons as a
professional group to develop stronger policies to avoid
and manage conflicts.
Nonfinancial and within role conflicts
Some of the suggestions outlined above to deal with finan-
cial conflicts (e.g. third party consent, second opinions
etc.) also have the potential to address nonfinancial and
within role conflicts. Inserting a neutral barrier between
the conflicted surgeon and their patient, may mediate the
conflict in some cases. Likewise disclosure is a necessary
first step in dealing with non-financial conflicts.o We note
that avoidance and divestment are less likely to be applic-
able to non-financial and within role conflicts, as we do
not advocate surgeons withdrawing from research and
teaching.
Another way in which nonfinancial and within role
conflicts might be addressed in cases such as the ASR
hip is through mandating the collection of relevant evi-
dence for or against the innovation and disseminating this
information.p The bias engendered by conflicts might be
tempered in the face of evidence which contradicts the
surgeon’s optimistic view of the innovation. This could be
achieved via compulsory registration of innovations such
as the ASR hipq so that outcomes data on safety and effi-
cacy are collected and made available in an independent
and objective fashion. This is not a new suggestion
[21-23], and in an earlier paper we flagged its potential
to address conflicts of interest [24]. We also noted two
challenges in implementing this approach, to do with
defining and identifying innovation (which is by no
means straightforward [25] and in this case would depend
on surgeons self identifying innovation); and in funding
such a mechanism.r
The gathering, analysis and dissemination of emerging
evidence have the potential to reduce patient harms,
bolster confidence in surgery and generate cost savings
in publically resourced health systems. In our view, this
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through pioneering new funding models.s As we have
suggested, it might also be possible to collect data
through local or institutional registers of innovative pro-
cedures and their outcomes, or by developing existing
review structures such as new interventions committees.
Such committees could function in a similar way to institu-
tional review boards established to review research, setting
out conditions for informed consent (which might include
mandatory third party provision of information) and mon-
itoring the introduction of innovations by collecting data
on outcomes. And while mandating national or inter-
national systems of registration is challenging, it is within
the remit of health care institutions to develop their own
systems for monitoring innovations within their premises
and using this information to better inform both patients
and practitioners.
Our suggested remedies to reduce the incidence and
effects of conflicts of interest in surgery are summarized
below.
At a minimum, we suggest:
1. Disclosure at an institutional level of all gifts,
payments and interactions between individual
surgeons and industry, with self-disclosure triangu-
lated against mandated industry disclosure of recipi-
ents of payments, and significant penalties (e.g. loss
of practising privileges) for failure to comply;
2. Disclosure by institutions of their remunerated
interactions with industry;
3. Review of the justifiability of 1 and 2, for example by
a formally constituted conflicts of interest review
committee, all of whose members lack relevant
conflicts, and which is charged with developing
policy for points 4 and 5;
4. Development of institutional policy on the
acceptability of relevant activities and the
prohibition of those that do not contribute to
improving patient care (for example, activities that
promote sales of specific devices);
5. Development of workable procedures for informing
the local community about: the nature and effects of
conflicts of interest; and the steps undertaken at the
institution for managing conflicts, including
provision of second opinions or brokered consent;
6. Recusal of any conflicted employees of the institution
from decision-making about relevant matters;
7. Development of local and national procedures for
collecting, analysing and disseminating data on
surgical innovations;
8. Development of mandatory modules on understanding
the neuropsychology of conflicts of interest in
surgical education and continuing education
programs.Summary
The implementation of the ASR hip is a case of surgical
innovation gone wrong. Though the hip promised to ad-
dress problems with earlier devices and to extend the
benefits of hip replacement to a new cohort of patients,
it failed to deliver on this promise and instead resulted
in significant patient harms. As we have shown, there
were multiple conflicts of interest involved in the uptake
of the ASR hip as well as attempts to gloss over the
mounting body of evidence about its lack of safety and
efficacy.
Conflicts of interest in surgery are not currently well
managed, with the traditional mechanism of disclosure
and recusal harbouring significant limitations.
Conflicts of interest need to be taken seriously in order
to avoid harms such as those experienced by recipients of
the ASR hip. We hope the strategies we have sketched out
in this paper can begin a process of engaging surgeons,
regulators, hospitals, patients and others in avoiding the
avoidable and minimising the unavoidable conflicts of
interest that are associated with surgical innovation.
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Endnotes
aThis version involves removing and replacing the head
of the thighbone (the femoral head) and the damaged
socket (acetabulum) with metal.
bResurfacing technology is newer. In the case of the ASR
hip it involves capping or resurfacing the femoral head
with a hemispherical covering, while a shell is used to
replace damaged bone and cartilage within the socket.
cThe term ‘learning curve’ is used to refer to the height-
ened risks to patients incurred while an individual surgeon
or surgical team obtains competency in procedures that
are new to them.
dWe have argued elsewhere that pursuing innovation is
a primary surgical obligation, i.e. that engaging in at
least some innovation (such as devising a new hip pros-
thesis) is a valid and even essential part of what it is to
be a good surgeon. W. Rogers and J. Johnson: Addressing
Within-Role Conflicts of Interest in Surgery, Journal of
Bioethical Inquiry 2013; 10: 219–225.
eIt is worth noting that some of the behaviour associated
with this case may have been fraudulent or illegal; these
are criminal matters and our suggestions do not deal
with these issues.
fIt may be, however, that disclosure can act as a prompt
or mechanism for reflection on the part of those
who are required to disclose payments, relationships
etc. Steinbrook R: Industry Payments to Physicians:
Lessons from Orthopedic Surgery. Arch Intern Med.
2011; 171(19): 1765–66.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/63gIn their study Lieberman et.al. found that patients had a
poor understanding of financial conflicts of interest in spite
of having detailed discussions on the issue. JR. Lieberman,
MJ. Pensak, MS. Kelleher, RR. Leger, and GG. Polkowski:
Disclosure of Financial Conflicts of Interest: An Evalu-
ation of Orthopaedic Surgery patients’ Understanding.
Clin Orthop Relat Res 2013; 471: 472–477.
hThis is consistent with findings by Camp et. al. indicat-
ing that patients were more concerned by gifts given to
surgeons by industry (perceived to benefit surgeons and
industry) than by payments, such as royalties, regarded
as being for activities associated with patient benefit. We
also note their suggestion that surgeons in receipt of
royalties should donate these when using the device in
question for their own patients.
iAccording to research by Lieberman et. al. regarding
financial conflicts of interest, supplying written informa-
tion to patients at an office visit is insufficient to ensure
patient comprehension. JR. Lieberman, MJ. Pensak, MS.
Kelleher, RR. Leger, and GG. Polkowski: Disclosure of
Financial Conflicts of Interest: An Evaluation of
Orthopaedic Surgery patients’ Understanding. Clin
Orthop Relat Res 2013; 471: 472–477. However, we note
the findings of Camp et. al. that less than 50% of patients
want to discuss the surgeon’s financial relationships in
the pre-operative consultation.
jWe note other problems with transparency including
the difficulties of: defining the scope of disclosure (espe-
cially as insignificant gifts can create bias); mandating
reporting; ensuring compliance (including the need for
triangulation through disclosure of industry payments
to individuals); and enforcing penalties. Kesselheim AS
and Maisel WH: Managing Financial and Nonfinancial
Conflicts of Interest in Healthcare Delivery. American J
of Therapeutics 2010, 17: 440–443.
kIt seems patients at least appear to believe that sur-
geons involved in the design of prosthesis will have a
greater clinical expertise and understanding of the
device and that this will likely lead to better outcomes.
J.R. Lieberman, M.J. Pensak, M.S. Kelleher, R.R. Leger,
and G.G. Polkowski. Disclosure of Financial Conflicts
of Interest: An Evaluation of Orthopaedic Surgery
patients’ Understanding. Clin Orthop Relat Res 2013;
471: 472–477.
lThis section builds on an earlier paper focused on non-
financial conflicts where we first raised these issues. W.
Rogers and J. Johnson Addressing Within-Role Con-
flicts of Interest in Surgery, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
2013; 10: 219–225. Kesselheim and Maisel also suggest
that second opinions may be warranted in some circum-
stances. Kesselheim AS and Maisel WH: Managing
Financial and Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in
Healthcare Delivery. American J of Therapeutics 2010,
17: 440–443.mThis could be circumvented by a patient returning to
their surgeon after the third party consent process so
that the surgeon can ensure the patient has fully under-
stood what the procedure involves and agreed to that
procedure.
nCamp et. al. claim banning financial relationships between
industry and surgeons will not work as surgical input is
essential to successful innovation. McKneally also makes a
case for the importance of industry partnerships to surgical
innovation, maintaining that, properly managed, they can
describe a virtuous rather than a vicious cycle. MF
McKneally: Beyond Disclosure: Managing Conflicts of
Interest to Strengthen Trust in Our Profession. Journal
of thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery 2007; 133: 300–2,
301. DiPaula and colleagues refer to American’s peak body
for orthopaedic surgeons’ consensus statement which notes
enhanced patient care requires collaboration with industry.
DiPaola CP, Dea N, Noonan VK, Bailey CS, Dvorak MFS,
Fisher CG: Surgeon-industry conflict of interest: survey
of North American’s opinions regarding surgeons con-
sulting with industry. The Spine J 2013, doi: 10.1016/j.
spinee.2013.06.028.
oSee for instance the discussion in Kesselheim and Mai-
sel, p. 442. Kesselheim AS and Maisel WH: Managing
Financial and Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in
Healthcare Delivery. American J of Therapeutics 2010,
17: 440–443.
pSurgical research is poorly funded in comparison to
pharmaceutical research. There is however more research
involving surgical devices and products than research into
techniques and procedures.
qThe role of the Australian National Joint Replacement
Registry in drawing attention to the ASR hip by identify-
ing high revision rates, was noted earlier.
rRegisters which collect and collate information in a
manner that is useful and relevant for patients are
expensive to establish and maintain.
sFor instance, in order to secure a funding base to sup-
port independent clinical research, the Italian Parliament
introduced a law requiring pharmaceutical companies to
pay a fee amounting to 5% of their marketing budget
(excluding salaries). Maybe device manufacturers could
be required to contribute to a similar scheme to support
the development of registers. Garattini S and Bertele V:
Comparative clinical effectiveness. Eurohealth 2009;
15, 4–6.
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